Current conceptions of international order define it through means of order. The menu that lies before scholars and pundits when discussing international orders typically includes balance of power, concert of powers, hegemony, and multilateralism.
John Ikenberry, in his After Victory, recognizes three variations of order: balance of power, hegemonic, and constitutional.
Patrick Morgan in the volume Regional Orders edited by David Lake and himself provides a typology of regional orders based on the question "how to achieve order," which includes: balance of power, concert of powers, collective security, security community, and integration.
More eclectic writers like David Shambaugh in the volume Power Shifts distinguishes between models of order such as: hegemony, major power rivalry, hub and spokes, concert of powers, condominium, normative community, and complex interdependence.
These variants are, to borrow the insights from Muthiah Alagappa in the volume Asian Security Order, "pathways to order," which is rooted in distribution of power (instrumental order), principles, norms, and rules (normative-contractual order), and trust and obligation (solidarist order).
Clearly, current conceptions of order emphasizes the how but not the who of order. They focus on the question "how to achieve order" but not "who is in" or "who controls the order."
In reality, the "who" question is primary while the "how" question is secondary. The former refers to the goal, the latter to the way.
International order must be defined in relation with the issue of regional and global leadership.
Friday, May 18, 2007
Wednesday, May 16, 2007
A Source of Security Strategy and Coalition
What do you need to get a cohesive coalition, at home or abroad? - A sense of purpose.
This is usually made by a common threat.
Thus the belief that security drives grand strategy and foreign policy.
But the threat needs not be imminent. It may comes from an experience in the past. And in this case, the purpose has been molded in this past experience. The threat becomes generic, not imminent.
Don't ask China why it builds up its military forces when nobody is threatening it. China's grand strategy is a response to its past humiliation rather than to current foreign threats.
This is usually made by a common threat.
Thus the belief that security drives grand strategy and foreign policy.
But the threat needs not be imminent. It may comes from an experience in the past. And in this case, the purpose has been molded in this past experience. The threat becomes generic, not imminent.
Don't ask China why it builds up its military forces when nobody is threatening it. China's grand strategy is a response to its past humiliation rather than to current foreign threats.
Monday, May 14, 2007
Sources of Grand Strategy and Regime Resilience
Grand strategy is much more than a military strategy. It refers to the full package of domestic and foreign policies. In a narrower sense, grand strategy is the logic underlying this policy package. Foreign policy is derived from grand strategy.
The policy calculus of grand strategy in general and the calculus of foreign policy in particular have, according to common sense, to take into account the dynamics of international and regional systems as well as the domestic imperatives of economic, political, security, and ideological issues. This statement is really common sensical - it is not interesting analytically. Here is more interesting analytically:
Grand strategy grows out of the match between international (often means regional for small states) power balances (configuration) and society's need for security, wealth, and position (standing, self-esteem), and influence (for major powers).
Viable grand strategies have to score high in this match.
Faced with an extremely hostile international environment, governments have two viable options.
The first is easier internationally but may be extremely difficult domestically. It is to transform into a grand strategy that accommodates the international power configuration. The rationale is to boost the grand strategy's score on security and wealth. Examples are the communist regimes in Eastern Europe that defected from the Soviet camp and opted for integration into the European Community and the West.
The second option is often easier domesticaly but will create difficulties on the international front. This option is to boost a grand strategy that is highly ambitious about its society's standing and self-esteem. This is to compensate the grand strategy's low score on security and also wealth. The net effect is to maintain grand strategy viability. Examples are the "ugly regimes" such as Iran, North Korea, and Cuba, but also Vietnam's anti-imperialists.
Grand strategy viability is the key to understanding why ugly regimes endure in an extremely hostile international environment.
The policy calculus of grand strategy in general and the calculus of foreign policy in particular have, according to common sense, to take into account the dynamics of international and regional systems as well as the domestic imperatives of economic, political, security, and ideological issues. This statement is really common sensical - it is not interesting analytically. Here is more interesting analytically:
Grand strategy grows out of the match between international (often means regional for small states) power balances (configuration) and society's need for security, wealth, and position (standing, self-esteem), and influence (for major powers).
Viable grand strategies have to score high in this match.
Faced with an extremely hostile international environment, governments have two viable options.
The first is easier internationally but may be extremely difficult domestically. It is to transform into a grand strategy that accommodates the international power configuration. The rationale is to boost the grand strategy's score on security and wealth. Examples are the communist regimes in Eastern Europe that defected from the Soviet camp and opted for integration into the European Community and the West.
The second option is often easier domesticaly but will create difficulties on the international front. This option is to boost a grand strategy that is highly ambitious about its society's standing and self-esteem. This is to compensate the grand strategy's low score on security and also wealth. The net effect is to maintain grand strategy viability. Examples are the "ugly regimes" such as Iran, North Korea, and Cuba, but also Vietnam's anti-imperialists.
Grand strategy viability is the key to understanding why ugly regimes endure in an extremely hostile international environment.
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