The Curse of Foresight and the Hungarian Paradox

Hungary irritates not only democratic-minded people but also curiosity-driven scholars. It forces Francis Fukuyama to ask "Do Institutions Really Matter?" It appears as a paradox to those who seek comfort in conventional wisdom. Hungary is famous as the most liberal state in the Soviet bloc; and its ruling party, led by the same Orban Viktor, who is currently the Prime Minister, was a driving force behind its turn to liberal democracy more than 20 years ago. Now the same person and the same party are, paradoxically, turning their back to the liberal democratic values they fought for under communism and their country to something similar to the one they fought against. Charles Gati has a very good piece describing the new-turning-to-old Hungary under Fidesz.

How do we explain this Hungarian paradox? Gati has insightful hints:

A recent poll reflects the country’s socialist frame of mind and its persistent nostalgia for a paternalistic welfare state: 57 percent of Hungarians believe they lived better before 1989, under János Kádár’s Communist regime. In truth, some did, but most did not. Nevertheless, the majority claims to long for Kádár’s “goulash communism.” What they really want, I suspect, is to return to a time when Hungary was the envy of its neighbors, when it was freer and more prosperous (on borrowed money and Soviet subsidies) than any other Communist country. Hungary was, in the idiom of the day, the happiest barrack in the Soviet camp.

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The current Hungarian domestic scene is best summed up by what Václav Havel said about Russia in 2009. His words apply to the illiberal, managed democracy that Hungary has come to be:

Everything seems to follow the rules of democracy. There are parliaments, there are elections, and there are political parties. But there are also highly worrisome and unnaturally close ties between elected officials, the judiciary, the police, and the secret services.

I was reminded of this observation when a friend came to say goodbye just before I checked out of Hotel Buda Mercure. To my astonishment, he removed the battery from his cell phone. He said that this way “they”—the authorities—might not know where he is or what he says. On three other occasions friends changed the subject on the phone when I wanted to discuss a political issue: “Nem telefon téma (Not a topic for the phone)”, they said. I remember that phrase from the 1980s. More than two decades after the collapse of communism here, fear—not pervasive, not insidious, not omnipresent, but fear all the same—has made a return appearance.

More than any other Eastern European countries, Hungary, along with Russia and Serbia, has something of its communist past to feel so nostalgic and proud of. The current economic crisis makes the contrast even more stark. The Fidesz policies are possible because people long for that past.

When I came to Hungary in 1986, only three years before the collapse of its communist regime, I felt like arriving to paradise. Social peace and relative prosperity characterized my perceived paradise. When I heard about the intellectuals debating whether crisis was the apt term to describe the country's situation, I admired their foresight. And when they debated whether the country needed a change of the socialist model (modellvaltas) or a change of the socialist regime (rendszervaltas), my admiration of their foresight was even more strengthened. In any event, I frequently heard Hungarians telling stories about the shortage of consumer goods and personal freedom in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union with a sense of pride that their country represented the opposite.

Had Hungary's intellectuals not had the foresight--probably driven by nationalism rather than pure intellect--of seeing the ultimate defect of socialist economy and let their country experience a similar fate that Poland and Vietnam and China had experienced, the likes of Orban Viktor might not have a chance to rule it now.

Lối sống và niềm tin - Ý thức hệ và vận mệnh

Những tệ nạn xã hội, cho đến cả sự chụp giật trong kinh doanh, là do con người nghĩ ngắn. Họ muốn đạt kết quả ngay. Sự lan tràn của lối sống ngắn hạn là do con người thiếu niềm tin. Thiếu niềm tin, họ không thể vững vàng và kiên nhẫn vượt qua các thử thách để đi cả chặng đường dài mà đến đích.

Niềm tin được tạo ra bởi tri thức (khối lượng kiến thức) hoặc tín điều (chiều sâu tôn giáo). Xã hội Việt Nam hiện tại thiếu cả hai. Điều đó quy định lối sống thống trị xã hội Việt Nam hiện nay: tệ nạn và chụp giật. Muốn đưa xã hội Việt Nam trở lại văn minh, cách trị tận gốc là phải tăng niềm tin trong xã hội bằng cách tăng khối lượng kiến thức và chiều sâu tôn giáo. (Chủ nghĩa cộng sản đã từng một thời góp phần làm tăng tri thức và tín điều ở Việt Nam.)

Điều này cũng cho thấy nền tảng ý thức hệ của một xã hội là hết sức quan trọng đối với họat động (và do đó, cả vận mệnh) của xã hội đó.

International Order Redefined

Current conceptions of international order define it through means of order. The menu that lies before scholars and pundits when discussing international orders typically includes balance of power, concert of powers, hegemony, and multilateralism.

John Ikenberry, in his After Victory, recognizes three variations of order: balance of power, hegemonic, and constitutional.

Patrick Morgan in the volume Regional Orders edited by David Lake and himself provides a typology of regional orders based on the question "how to achieve order," which includes: balance of power, concert of powers, collective security, security community, and integration.

More eclectic writers like David Shambaugh in the volume Power Shifts distinguishes between models of order such as: hegemony, major power rivalry, hub and spokes, concert of powers, condominium, normative community, and complex interdependence.

These variants are, to borrow the insights from Muthiah Alagappa in the volume Asian Security Order, "pathways to order," which is rooted in distribution of power (instrumental order), principles, norms, and rules (normative-contractual order), and trust and obligation (solidarist order).

Clearly, current conceptions of order emphasizes the how but not the who of order. They focus on the question "how to achieve order" but not "who is in" or "who controls the order."

In reality, the "who" question is primary while the "how" question is secondary. The former refers to the goal, the latter to the way.

International order must be defined in relation with the issue of regional and global leadership.

A Source of Security Strategy and Coalition

What do you need to get a cohesive coalition, at home or abroad? - A sense of purpose.

This is usually made by a common threat.

Thus the belief that security drives grand strategy and foreign policy.

But the threat needs not be imminent. It may comes from an experience in the past. And in this case, the purpose has been molded in this past experience. The threat becomes generic, not imminent.

Don't ask China why it builds up its military forces when nobody is threatening it. China's grand strategy is a response to its past humiliation rather than to current foreign threats.

Sources of Grand Strategy and Regime Resilience

Grand strategy is much more than a military strategy. It refers to the full package of domestic and foreign policies. In a narrower sense, grand strategy is the logic underlying this policy package. Foreign policy is derived from grand strategy.

The policy calculus of grand strategy in general and the calculus of foreign policy in particular have, according to common sense, to take into account the dynamics of international and regional systems as well as the domestic imperatives of economic, political, security, and ideological issues. This statement is really common sensical - it is not interesting analytically. Here is more interesting analytically:

Grand strategy grows out of the match between international (often means regional for small states) power balances (configuration) and society's need for security, wealth, and position (standing, self-esteem), and influence (for major powers).

Viable grand strategies have to score high in this match.

Faced with an extremely hostile international environment, governments have two viable options.

The first is easier internationally but may be extremely difficult domestically. It is to transform into a grand strategy that accommodates the international power configuration. The rationale is to boost the grand strategy's score on security and wealth. Examples are the communist regimes in Eastern Europe that defected from the Soviet camp and opted for integration into the European Community and the West.

The second option is often easier domesticaly but will create difficulties on the international front. This option is to boost a grand strategy that is highly ambitious about its society's standing and self-esteem. This is to compensate the grand strategy's low score on security and also wealth. The net effect is to maintain grand strategy viability. Examples are the "ugly regimes" such as Iran, North Korea, and Cuba, but also Vietnam's anti-imperialists.

Grand strategy viability is the key to understanding why ugly regimes endure in an extremely hostile international environment.

Post-Cold War world order

I call our contemporary era "post-Cold War" for our convenience. We lack an appropriate label for our age. The post-Cold War era has witnessed several grand developments:

• The surge of globalization,
• The endurance of U.S. unipolarity,
• The rise of China, and in the foreseeable future, of India as well,
• The emergence of Jihadism.

To understand the post-Cold War world order, we need to answer the major questions:

• Why is the United States faced not with balancing efforts from the other great powers but with terrorist attacks from networks based in the Middle East?
• Can China rise to the position of world hegemon (and replace the United States)?
• Can globalization alter the nature (and outcome) of power competition?

To answer these questions, we need to develop theoretical thoughts about:

• Motivation and mobilization
• Group motivation
• The interplay of power (constraints and resources) and ideas (historical exprience)

Preface

I use this blog as my online notebook. This will serve as a mobile device to help me organize and clarify thoughts that are inspirative and not conclusive.

My interests can be divided into three major groups: world politics, theory, and Vietnam.

A more standard description of my research interests is: grand strategy making, foreign policy change, Asian security, and international relations theory.